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Abstract
The paper analyses an irrigation water tariff model to control overconsumption by implementing effective penal-
ties that can be seen as a supplementary tool to crop-specific quotas. This progressive pricing system is based on 
the financial loss that farmers would face when having to reduce their irrigation water consumption in order to 
comply with the commitment to achieving more restrictive quotas. Results show that a single fixed price system 
(with a flat rate) is costlier to farmers than the differentiated tariff system, which distinguishes the amount of water 
that exceeds the established allocation from the quantity below. This system of irrigation water pricing and over-
consumption penalties, aimed specifically at each crop, facilitates efficient utilisation and the ability to adjust this 
consumption to resource availability and current economic and market situations, especially in response to crop 
subsidies. The practical barriers to implementing differentiated tariffs per crop with overconsumption penalties are 
the availability of irrigation water marginal productivity and net profit functions, and having to install technological 
equipment to control the water being used by individual farmers. 
Additional key words: irrigation allocation; optimum water use; water management; water productivity; water 
value.
Resumen
Diseño de tarifas del agua de riego con sanciones al consumo excesivo
Este trabajo analiza un modelo de tarifas de agua de riego útil para disuadir consumos excesivos, a través de un 
sistema de sanciones eficientes, como instrumento de control complementario al de cuotas específicas de cultivo. 
Este sistema de precios progresivos se basa en la disminución de ganancias que habrían de afrontar los regantes 
cuando ajustan sus riegos a unas cuotas más restrictivas. Los resultados muestran que un sistema de tarifa única 
es más costoso para el agricultor que un sistema de tarifas diferenciadas, por el que se distingue entre el consumo 
por encima y por debajo de la cuota permitida. Este sistema de precios del agua y sanciones a los consumos en 
exceso, específico para cada cultivo, contribuye a lograr un uso eficiente de este recurso, ajustándolo a su disponi-
bilidad, a la coyuntura de los mercados y a los subsidios a los cultivos. Para su correcta aplicación, es preciso 
conocer las funciones de productividad y beneficio marginal del agua de riego para cada cultivo y zona, y también 
la instalación de un adecuado equipamiento que permita el control individualizado de los volúmenes utilizados por 
los usuarios.
Palabras clave adicionales: asignación y uso óptimo del agua de riego; gestión del agua; productividad del agua; 
valor del agua. 
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help to reduce water consumption sharply. This is very 
important in water shortage situations. 
This paper examines the use of optimal pricing for 
irrigation water demand, as well as the use of optimal 
penalties to sanction water consumption that exceeds 
crop-specific quotas. As is explained in greater detail, 
these penalties can be fixed by estimating the loss of 
profit that may result from reducing water consumption 
to accurately defined quotas. This calculation can only 
be made when functions of marginal value or net mar-
ginal profit of water are available for each crop in every 
area. 
Optimum social allocations of irrigation 
water
Irrigation water is considered an economic asset and 
consequently the cost associated with its supply, use 
or management and the perceived benefits should be 
considered when drawing up water pricing policies 
(Altmann, 2007). The WFD encouraged the analysis 
of water service cost recovery in compliance with Ar-
ticles 5 and 9, and Appendix III. The cost associated 
with water use can be classified into three types: finan-
cial cost, related to water services, include provision 
and management cost, operational and maintenance 
cost, or capital cost; environmental cost means the cost 
of the negative impact that the unsustainable use of 
water resources has on the environment; resource cost 
means the opportunity cost associated with the losses 
that users face when resources cannot be used, due to 
overexploitation or depletion.
These different cost types determine the rational use 
of such resources as irrigation water, in the optimum 
social situation, which theoretically occurs when the net 
private marginal benefit (NPMB) and the social mar-
ginal cost (SMC) are the same (NPMB = SMC). Pearce 
and Turner (1995) show a similar model developed to 
deduce the socially optimum use of a natural resource 
or the optimum pollution level. However, the price of 
the end product is considered instead of the price of one 
of the inputs, as it is in this case with water.
According to these authors, social marginal cost is 
defined as the combination of environmental marginal 
cost (EMC) and the user marginal cost, the latter being 
equivalent to the resource marginal cost (RMC). Eq. 
[1] summarizes this definition:
 NPMB = SMC = EMC + RMC [1] 
Introduction
Water stressed regions, such as the Mediterranean 
and other arid regions in the world, are often faced with 
a situation in which available water resources are not 
sufficient to meet all the demands for water-related 
goods and services as different demands compete for 
water. Generally, the ownership or use of scarce re-
sources generates major competitive advantages, thus 
creating a surplus. The sustainable management of the 
resources requires the administration to play an active 
role in order to satisfy all demands including environ-
mental uses and to maintain competitive processes, 
constantly adjusting all companies’ economic activities 
to market demands and to the resources available (Cha-
harbaghi and Lynch, 1999).
In shortage situations, in which excessive water 
consumption might lead to negative effects on the en-
vironment, the conceptual idea of the cost of resources 
becomes more important. As Ferrer and La Roca (2006) 
point out, in arid or semi-arid regions it would make 
sense to manage these episodes by splitting the losses 
between users and ecosystems. 
The Water Framework Directive 2000/60/CE (OJ, 
2000) (WFD) requires member countries to conduct 
economic analyses of water uses in order to implement 
the program of measures. The WFD also requires the 
principle of water related services costs recovery to be 
applied, including the environmental and the resource-
related costs, the latter being associated with the op-
portunity costs that are equivalent to the economic 
value of the opportunities waived when allocating the 
resource to a given user (Berbel et al., 2007).
Molle (2009) concludes after a wide review of cases, 
that rational management is achieved mainly by imple-
menting clear, flexible quotas, which can also be 
adapted to fluctuations in water availability by carrying 
out multiannual preventive drought management. The 
economic losses due to reduced supply would make it 
unnecessary to recover environmental costs. 
Furthermore, WFD encourages the use of pricing as 
an effective tool for regulating use, managing sustain-
able consumption and conserving the resource (Cornish 
and Perry, 2003; Hellegers and Perry, 2004). Navarro 
et al. (2007) state that installing water meters and es-
tablishing tariffs for crop-specific allocations that help 
to adjust doses and burden the actual use, would permit 
water saving and reward efficient farmers while sanc-
tioning the inefficient ones. Pricing is especially useful 
when optimum allocations are surpassed, since it can 
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This can be seen in Figure 1, where q* represents 
the amount of irrigation water that must be used in 
socially optimum conditions. Therefore, along with 
Eq. [1] the water consumed by irrigation in a socially 
optimum situation means that the private marginal 
profit is equivalent to the social marginal cost.
The analytical complexity involved in estimating 
the environmental and resource costs is mainly due 
to the difficulty in measuring external factors. The 
quota system is extensively used by way of a practi-
cal solution, because it is the system that is conducive 
to the suitable use of water while minimising external 
factors, theoretically because the quota setting is 
based on resource availability and the environmental 
flows required for good ecological and chemical 
status. 
However, on the basis of the marginal value of water, 
integrating the area under the NPMB curve between 
two levels of irrigation water, provides a good estima-
tion of the economic benefits associated with water use 
(measured as profit from water use).
Although demand curves have been developed using 
different methodologies in Spain (e.g. Berbel and 
Gomez-Limón, 2000; Berbel et al., 2009), there have 
been very few studies relating net marginal profit of 
irrigation water on the basis of water supply at crop 
level, as most of the research estimates demand at farm 
level based upon a mixture of crops (e.g. Gomez- 
Limón et al., 2001; Navarro et al., 2007). 
As an example of this type of study, Figure 2 shows 
a NPMB curve for irrigation water in Navarra (autono-
mous community located in northeastern Spain). We 
estimate this curve by ordinary least squares regression 
using data on per hectare water allocation and gross 
margin per cubic meter taken from Riegos de Navarra 
(2009). Gross margin is defined as the difference be-
tween the total income and direct cost. Gross margin 
per cubic meter is calculated as the ratio between per-
hectare gross margin and per hectare water allocation. 
The NPMB curve in Figure 2 is not exactly the mar-
ginal value of water but it may be considered as a first 
approximation of the marginal value of water function 
in Navarra, as an average for all irrigated crops and 
areas there. 
Pricing systems for irrigation water
In order to develop an operational methodology for 
optimal pricing, the farmers’ net private benefit (NPB) 
may be broken down into the following Eq. [2]:
 NPB = PI – PC = PI – (PCNW + PCW) =
 = PI – [PCNW + (PCnf + PCf )] 
[2]
where PI = private income; PC = private costs; PCNW 
= private costs not related to water; PCW = private costs 
related to water; PCnf = private costs of water not re-
lated to the water fee; and PCf = private cost related to 
the water fee. 
Water price should be greater than the financial cost 
of water services, since the aim is not only to apply the 
cost recovery principle, but also to include the envi-
ronmental and social cost as Eq. [1] proposes. The 
value of PCf is defined by PCf = FW q, as long as FW 
represents the rate or water use fee that should be col-
lected per cubic metre; then PMCf = FW. That volumet-









Figure 1. Socially optimum irrigation water allocation 
(q*) Q (m3 ha–1) = irrigation water; NPBM (€ m–3) = net private 
marginal benefit; SMC (€ m–3) = social marginal cost; 
RMC (€ m–3) = resource marginal cost; EMC (€ m–3) = environ-









NPMB = 69.747 · Q–0.7201
R 2 = 0.9983
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
NPMB (€ m–3)
Figure 2. Estimated marginal value of irrigation water (NPMB) 
based on the allocation (Q) for Navarra. Source: Own prepara-
tion from Riegos de Navarra (2009).
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istrative price” of water, can take several forms. Con-
sequently we may define the following tariff systems: 
i) A single ‘flat rate - per area’ fee is used, regardless 
of the water consumption; this would be the case for 
an irrigation surface based fixed fees system.
ii) A single fee is used for every unit of water 
which is used, regardless of the total water consump-
tion: FW = k.
iii) Different fees are calculated individually per 
quotas or by consumption groups, a block-rate system 
with block tariffs as a type of step-wise volumetric 
charges: 
 FW =  k1 ↔ q < Q1
k2 ↔ Q1 < q < Q2
k3 ↔ Q2 < q < Q3
k3 …
iv) A completely progressive fee system is pre-
ferred: FW = m(q) · q, or any other non-linear function 
that increases as q increases, so that ‘m (q)’ is the 
volumetric fee (€ m–3, depending on ‘q’).
Penalties by charging higher fees for water use 
would be introduced when a certain optimum allocation 
is exceeded. By definition, this is the case in iii) and 
iv), since the unit price or volumetric fee increases 
directly as use increases, either in a discrete (step-wise) 
or a continuous fee system.
It is customary in most irrigation schemes to distrib-
ute the available water following an egalitarian crite-
rion, so that farmers choose crops and cropland on the 
basis of this availability. This means that some crops 
may receive more than the average doses while others 
are irrigated in deficit or even in a rain-supplied situa-
tion. One alternative is to assign crop-specific quotas, 
on the basis of the crops’ theoretical needs and, should 
allocations be reduced, redefine these quotas on the 
basis of the consequent loss of profit. 
An example of block-rate system, seen in MARM 
(2008), was proposed in Navarra where consumption 
exceeding more than 10% and up to 20% leads to a 
water fee increase of 300%, and consumption over 20% 
of allocation leads to a 500% increase in price. A crop-
specific pricing system for irrigation water is also 
presented in MARM (2008), together with a simple 
calculation methodology: differences in water needs 
between certain crops and the ones consuming least 
water (grain cereals) are established. Then, taking the 
water fee for the latter as the benchmark, correlative 
fees can be proposed on the basis of the differences in 
water needs. Such a methodology for designing quotas 
and fees may be based upon Water Planning Technical 
Guidelines (Ministerial Order ARM2656/2008 pub-
lished in BOE, 2008), where acceptable net water ne-
cessities are indicated for several crops groups and for 
each hydrographic district.
This system of crop-specific quotas, together with 
progressive pricing, has been successfully used in the 
Jordan Valley, where it has not only helped to obtain 
some saving in water use, but has also encouraged 
farmers to upgrade their irrigation systems (Molle et 
al., 2008). In Israel, a distinction is made between types 
of agricultural water on the basis of its quality, average 
prices being charged for high quality water, partially 
salty water and treated waste water. A differentiated 
pricing system based on an original 1989 reference 
quota is now established for at least the first type: up 
to 50% of that allocation is charged at NIS1 0.691 m–3; 
from 50 to 80% of it, at NIS 0.833 m–3, representing a 
tariff increase of 20.5%; and for consumptions over 
80%, NIS 1.118 m–3, equivalent to a raise of 61.8% 
from the original price (Fernández Buckley, 2001). 
Methodology
Calculating fees and efficient 
overconsumption penalties
The following methodology is based on establishing 
penalties for water consumption over the optimum al-
locations, as a way of achieving efficiency in irrigation. 
It is essential to define the quota itself, which should 
be crop-specific and correlated to water reserves. To 
simplify matters, it will be assumed that there are no 
crop changes in the area used as an example.
Penalties are established using the obtainable net 
private marginal profit curve for a crop, (NPMB), as a 
function of the water used q. Therefore, when establish-
ing suitable tariffs to control overconsumption it is 
required that: i) the NPMB curve must enable the user 
to estimate, specifically for every point, the marginal 
profit yielded by the level of used water; ii) integration 
of the NPMB curve up to a level of water use provides 
the economic profit that can be attributed to that water 
use. Therefore, the model will only be reliable if these 
NPMB curves are accurately defined. 
1 NIS (New Israel Shekel) would be changed in 2010: 1 NIS = 0.35 €.
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Figure 3 illustrates the point when an allocation q0 
is set so high that it involves external factors and op-
portunity costs, hence it should be reduced to q1, which 
could be called “critical”. Even so, as long as the water 
fee is low enough, farmers would rather keep the 
original water use q0, over q1, as it would enable them 
to carry on making extra profit, shown in the shaded 
area below the NPMB curve between q1 and q0 and with 
a value given by:
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[3]
where f0 is the water fee farmers pay.
This extra profit for a given individual farmer can 
be seen by the rest of the farmers as an unwanted cost, 
in the sense that they would be deprived of using that 
extra amount q0 – q1; therefore this cost valuing NPB10 
is the cost of a q0 – q1 water resource. 
On this basis, if the objective is to achieve an effi-
cient consumption in the interest of saving water re-
sources, a pricing system that suitably taxes the use of 
water over and above new given quotas could be intro-
duced, in order to deter farmers from consuming too 
much water. Therefore, it is necessary for the penalty 
or fee increase that would be imposed to be greater than 
unfair profit: S10 > NPB10. Charging this penalty would 
make it feasible to recover the cost of the resources 
arising from the q0 – q1 overconsumption. 
This penalty could be applied either to the whole 
consumption, with one single extra fee to be added to 
the original, or only to the surplus, to which an addi-
tional fee is applied exclusively (differentiated fees per 
consumption groups), which seems to be the more 
reasonable option. As can also be seen in Figure 3, 
when considering the effective penalty, the area 
f0AB(fa+f0) should be larger than the shaded area for 
the first case, and the rectangular area ACDE should 
be larger than that shaded area for the second option.
Once the efficient q1 quota is approved, the efficient 
fee to be charged for the irrigation water actually used, 
q, can be calculated for both systems. In the two cases, 
if the allocation is observed ( ∀ <q q1 ), there would be 
no penalty (S1q = 0), so, the initial fee f0 would remain 
unchanged.
a) Single fee system
∀ ≤q q1 , the original fee, f0, remains unchanged.
∀ >q q1 , a new flat and single rate, fa, for the entire 
amount used is added to f0 (the penalty is applied to the 
whole water quantity without distinction).
fa can be obtained with the following formula:












Integrating and isolating fa:
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When the NPMB function is linear, the previous 
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where m(q) is the slope of that straight line 




( ) ) and k is its independent term.
The penalty concerned will be determined by the 
difference between the amount to be paid with this new 
tariff and the amount originally paid:
S1 > fa · q
b) Differentiated fees system
∀ ≤q q1 , the original f0 fee is applied.
∀ >q q1 , a new fb tariff is added to f0, which is ap-
plied exclusively to overconsumption q – q1 (for the 










F, NPMB (€ m–3)
NPMB
Figure 3. Fees and overconsumption penalties (F) established 
on the basis of the obtainable net private marginal benefit 
(NPMB) from water allocation (Q). Source: Own preparation.
Q (m3 ha–1)
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of the above, fb can be calculated from the following 
formula:
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[7]
Then, considering that:
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the following is obtained:
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Integrating and isolating fb:
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When the NPMB function is linear, the above expres-













 ∀ = ⋅ +NPMB q m q k( )  [11]
where m is the slope of the straight line 




( ) ) and k is its independent term.
The penalty concerned will only sanction overcon-
sumption, with this new fee, the following expression 
being used (for the consumption under the q1 quota the 
original tariff is applied): 
S2 > fb (q – q1)
Case study: irrigated olive groves  
in the Guadalbullon River Sub-basin
This section applies the model described to a case 
study involving irrigated olives groves in the Guadal-
bullon River Sub-basin, in the Upper Guadalquivir 
Basin (Southern Spain). The aforementioned sub-basin 
is affected by specific water scarcity problems, because 
it is not regulated yet still supplies major irrigation 
areas, especially olive groves. The marginal profit func-
tion for irrigation water in Figure 4 has been obtained 
by applying a regression analysis to the original data 
on water production function in Mesa-Jurado et al. 
(2010), where these authors adapt the water production 
function used by Moriana et al. (2003) to the Guadal-
bullon area and production  system.
In some Guadalquivir olive grove areas such as 
Guadalbullon, a water allocation of 1,500 m3 ha–1 is 
available, but in the Guadalbullon Sub-basin, this crop 
rarely has such amounts at its disposal. The average 
quota for the last four years was around 1,000 m3 ha–1, 
according to the information obtained from some ir-
rigation communities. Figure 4 shows the marginal 
value or NPMB function of water, once the variable 
production costs (including the cost of irrigation and 










300 500 700 900 1,100 1,300 1,500 1,700 1,900 2,100 2,300
NPMB (€ m–3)
Q (m3 ha–1)
Figure 4. Water marginal value or net marginal profit vs. water allocation for Guadalbullon River Sub-basin olive grove. Source: 
Own preparation from Mesa-Jurado et al. (2010).
NPMB = –0.0001634 Q + 0.76514
R 2 = 0.9974
NPMB = –0.0006228 Q + 1.45413
R 2 = 0.999
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income. Since the economic value of water in agricul-
ture can be measured by the profit farmers obtain from 
a given amount of this resource, for irrigated olives 
groves in the Guadalbullon River Sub-basin the mar-
ginal value amounts to € 0.60 m–3 for an annual alloca-
tion of 1,000 m3 ha–1, and € 0.53 m–3 for 1,500 m3 ha–1 
(average 2005-2008 data series analysed). This calcu-
lation reveals how the NPMB function changes its 
gradient as a consequence of the law of diminishing 
marginal returns. 
The discontinuity in the curve around 1,500 m3 ha–1 
is due to the saturation of the system with the present 
density of 100 trees ha–1. Obviously, this is an estima-
tion of the performance of an average farm but it is 
considered to reasonably reflect the performance of 
irrigated olive groves in the Upper Guadalquivir 
Basin.
Results 
In accordance with the theoretical fundamentals 
explained above, the pricing system to be introduced 
in order to limit overuse in a given allocation, can be 
calculated once the NPMB function is estimated by a 
regression for irrigated olives groves in the Guadalbul-
lon River Sub-basin. The penalty imposed is calcu-
lated as shown in previous sections of this paper, bear-
ing in mind that in this case, m is different depending 
on whether q is over or under the critical allocation 
(1,500 m3 ha–1), which defines the NPMB inflection 
point. Both pricing systems results are explained at the 
end of the paper. However, the way that the differenti-
ated fees for the consumption groups are calculated is 
explained in detail below. 
Calculating differentiated fees for the case 
study
i) Assuming that the aim is to reduce the original 
allocation q0 = 1,500 m3 ha–1 to q1 = 1,000 m3 ha–1; for 
calculation purposes, this is equivalent to stating that 
when breaking this limitation by using q = 1,500 m3 
ha–1, an overuse of 500 m3 ha–1 is being made. Since q1 
< 1,500 m3 ha–1, NPMB(q) = – 0.0001634 q + 0.76514 








In this case, when imposing tariffs for consumptions 
over the new allocation (q>q1), fees should be applied 













= € 0.5609 m–3
As a result, the 500 m3 of overused resources would 
be sanctioned with the following penalty:
S2 > fb (q – q1) = € 280.43 ha–1
ii) Let’s assume that the original allocation is 
q0 = 2,000 m3 ha–1, and the aim is to cut it down to 
q1 = 1,500 m3 ha–1; for calculation purposes, if the quota 
is exceeded by q = 2,000 m3 ha–1, there is again an over-
consumption of 500 m3 ha–1. Now, q1 > 1,500 m3 ha–1 
and NPMB(q) = – 0.0006228 q + 1.45413 (see Figure 4), 








Therefore, the extra charge to be applied to the quota 













= € 0.3643 m–3
The 500 m3 ha–1 of overused resources would be 
sanctioned in the following way: 
S2 > fb · (q – q1) = € 182.16 ha–1
These results and those for the equivalent single fee 
system are shown in Table 1. It can be seen that penal-
ties are applied only when the quotas are surpassed. 
Considering an original fee of f0 = € 0.35 m–3, the con-
sequences of complying with the established q1 alloca-
tion are considered.
The last column in this table shows the cost of water 
a farmer would have to pay for irrigating one olive 
grove hectare, with both pricing systems, when the 
respective penalties are applied. It can be seen in this 
column that the differentiated fees system involves a 
lower cost.
Discussion 
The use of water tariffs and quotas has been widely 
studied in literature and suitable results have been 
achieved for the purpose of reducing consumption 
when farmers find that the value of water is unequal 
J. Alarcón et al. / Span J Agric Res (2011) 9(4), 971-980978
(see e.g. Chohin-Kuper et al., 2002; Rieu, 2005; Ro-
dríguez-Ferrero et al., 2008).
This paper explains a water tariff system that imple-
ments effective penalties aimed at controlling overcon-
sumption. It can be regarded as a tool that is supple-
mentary to crop-specific quotas since this progressive 
pricing system is based on the loss of income that farm-
ers would face when adjusting their irrigation amounts 
to more restrictive quotas. The fundamentals of this 
economic system are conducive to fulfilling the com-
mitment of recovering the cost of the water service, 
although its achievements and effects should be care-
fully tested in practice.
The sustainable management of natural resources 
should be achieved through allocating them in a socially 
optimum way, as has been explained in this paper. This 
means minimising the private and social cost associated 
with such resources. Consequently, i) quotas ought to be 
assigned on the basis of the water requirements for each 
crop, depending on where it is grown and the irrigation 
system used; ii) penalties for overuse should be higher 
than the potential profit that those irrigated areas could 
yield, so that they will either dissuade users from con-
suming excessively, or to make it possible to recover the 
cost of the extra resources that have been consumed. 
The study focused on the Guadalbullon River Sub-
basin has shown that a single fixed price system (with a 
flat rate) is costlier for the farmer than the differentiated 
fees system, which makes a distinction between the 
amount that exceeds the established allocation and the 
quantity below that allocation. This irrigation water pric-
ing and overconsumption penalties system, both of 
which are crop-specific, makes it easier to achieve ef-
ficient consumption and to adjust this consumption to 
the resource availability and current economic and mar-
ket situations, especially in response to crop subsidies. 
There are two practical barriers to implementing 
differentiated tariffs per crop with overconsumption 
penalties: both crop-specific functions of the marginal 
value of irrigation water and measurement of the water 
used by individual farmers are essential. With respect 
to this, it should be pointed out that the water legisla-
tion currently in force in Spain encourages farmers to 
install metering devices (Order ARM/1312/2009, pub-
lished in BOE, 2009). Research in this field should be 
encouraged, with a view to obtaining a better under-
standing of the economic value of water in agriculture 
and so that socially effective economic tools can be 
devised to control water consumption. Further research 
should also be conducted into estimating water re-
Table 1. Example of tariffs (f), overconsumption penalties (S) and water cost (W) under single fee and differentiated fees sys-
tems. Source: Own preparation









– 0.0001634 q + 0.76514
f0 = 0.35
f > f0 + fa = 0.7703
S10 = 0
S10 > fa·q0 = 630.43
W10 = f0·q0 = 350









– 0.0006228 q + 1.4541
f0 = 0.35
f > f0 + fa = 0.7036
S10 = 0
S10 > fa·q0 = 707.16
W10 = f0·q0 = 525










– 0.0001634 q + 0.76514
f0 = 0.35
only to q0 – q1 : 
 f > f0 + fb = 0.9109
S10 = 0
S10 > fb (q0 – q1) =
= 280.43
W10 = f0·q0 = 350









– 0.0006228 q + 1.45413
f0 = 0.35
only to q0 – q1 : 
 f > f0 + fb = 0.7143
S10 = 0
S10 > fb (q0 – q1) = 
= 182.16
W10 = f0·q0 = 525
W10 > f0·q0 + S10 =
= 882.16
Note: calculations for f0 = € 0.35 m–3.
979Devising irrigation water tariffs with overconsumption penalties
sources availability, so that the regulating quotas can 
be constantly updated in response to this availability. 
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